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Abstract
We propose Keynesian utilities as a new class of non-expected utility functions
representing the preferences of investors for optimism, defined as the composition
of the investor’s preferences for risk and her preferences for ambiguity. The
optimism or pessimism of Keynesian utilities is determined by empirical proxies
for risk and ambiguity. Bulls and bears are defined respectively as optimistic and
pessimistic investors. The resulting family of Afriat inequalities are necessary and
sufficient for rationalizing the asset demands of bulls and bears with Keynesian
utilities.
JEL Classification: D81, G02, G11
Keywords: Uncertainty, Optimism, Afriat inequalities
1 Introduction
Financial markets unlike roulette or craps are not games of chance. There are no well
defined relative frequencies of future payoffs of financial assets. More generally, the
returns in financial markets are not generated by Brownian motion. Random walks
down Wall Street have no ex post empirical foundation – see Mandelbroit (2004).
The modern theory of finance, also termed stochastic finance by some authors, is a
subfield of applied probability theory that at best is a normative theory of gambling
in idealized casinos. It is not a descriptive theory of an investor’s behavior in financial
markets.
Bracha and Brown (2012) extended the theory of variational preferences intro-
duced by F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, and A. Rustichini [MMR] (2006) to a theory
of revealed preferences for ambiguity, where investors are ambiguity-seeking iff they
believe today that tomorrow large state-utility payoffs are more likely than small
state-utility payoffs and investors are ambiguity-averse iff they believe today that
tomorrow small state-utility payoffs are more likely than large state-utility payoffs.
That is, Bracha and Brown conflate the notions of ambiguity and optimism. This
∗Research Department, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 600 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, MA
02210, USA
†Department of Economics, Yale University, Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520-8268, USA.
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equivalence of optimism and ambiguity is a mathematical implication not a substan-
tive consequence of their economic model. Optimism or pessimism is the defining
characteristic of the investor’s unobservable beliefs on the likelihood of future payoffs,
but ambiguity-aversion is a fundamental aspect of the investor’s revealed preferences
for risk and ambiguity, i.e., observable choice. Recall that the domain of the utility
functions representing preferences for ambiguity in MMR and in Bracha and Brown
are state-utility vectors, not state-contingent claims, as in the Arrow- Debreu general
equilibrium analysis of markets with uncertainty, see chapter 7 in Debreu (1959).
 show that utility functions concave in state-utility vectors are ambiguity-
averse. Bracha and Brown show that utility functions convex in state-utility vectors
are ambiguity-seeking. Using the Legendre—Fenchel biconjugate representation of
convex functions and the envelope theorem they also show that the unobserved be-
liefs of investors are the gradient, with respect to state-utility vectors, of the investor’s
utility function. As is well known in convex analysis, the gradient of a function is
a monotone increasing map iff the function is a convex function. It follows that in-
vestors are ambiguity-seeking iff they are optimistic. In a similar argument, Bracha
and Brown show that investors are ambiguity-averse iff they are pessimistic. Their
characterization of investor’s behavior in financial markets, where investor’s prefer-
ences are not over state-contingent claims but over unobservable state-utility vectors,
makes their econometric models difficult to identify and estimate.
The subtitle of this paper is bulls and bears. Here’s why. Keynes (1936): “The
market price will be fixed at the point at which the sales of the bears and the purchases
of the bulls are balanced.” Sargent (2008) remarks: “The use of expectations in
economic theory is not new. Many earlier economists, including A. C. Pigou, John
Maynard Keynes, and John R. Hicks, assigned a central role in the determination
of the business cycle to people’s expectations about the future. Keynes referred
to this as ‘waves of optimism and pessimism’ that helped determine the level of
economic activity.” Consequently, we introduce Keynesian utilities as a new class of
non-expected utilities, representing the investor’s preferences for optimism. This is
an empirically tractable and descriptive characterization of an investor’s preferences
in financial markets, where she is either a bull or a bear. Simply put, bulls are
optimistic and believe that market prices will go up, but bears are pessimistic and
believe that market prices will go down. Hence bulls buy long and bears sell short.
Keynesian utilities are defined as the composition of the investor’s preferences
for risk and her preferences for ambiguity, where we assume preferences for risk and
preferences for ambiguity are independent. If () denotes preferences for risk, and
() denotes preferences for ambiguity then
 :  ⊆ ++ →  ⊆ ++
and
 :  ⊆ ++ → 
where
→  ◦ ()
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is the composition of  and  , denoted  ◦ ()This specification is a special case
of amenable functions, introduced by Rockafellar (1988). We make the additional
assumption that () is a concave or convex diagonal map. See Rockafellar and Wets
(1998) for a discussion of chain rules for amenable functions. Here we use a chain rule
originally proposed by Bentler and Lee (1978) and proved in Magnus and Neudecker
(1985). In our model, bulls are investors endowed with convex Keynesian utilities
and bears are investors endowed with concave Keynesian utilities. It follows from
convex analysis that these specifications are equivalent to assuming that investors
are bulls iff they have optimistic beliefs about the future payoffs of state-contingent
claims and that investors are bears iff they have pessimistic beliefs about the future
payoffs of state-contingent claims.
In the following 2 × 2 contingency table on the types of Keynesian utilities, the
rows are ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-seeking preferences and the columns are
risk-averse and risk-seeking preferences. The cells are the investor’s preferences for
optimism and pessimism. The diagonal cells of the table are the symmetric Keynesian
utilities and the off-diagonal cells of the table are the asymmetric Keynesian utilities.
Table 1
Keynesian preferences Risk-averse Risk-seeking
Ambiguity-averse Bears Asymmetric
Ambiguity-seeking Asymmetric Bulls
It is not surprising that bears have Keynesian utilities that are the composition of
ambiguity-averse preferences and risk-averse preferences or that bulls have Keynesian
utilities that are the composition of ambiguity-seeking preferences and risk-seeking
preferences. This observation follows from the theorems in convex analysis on the
convexity or concavity of the composition of monotone convex or concave functions.
See section 3.2 in Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004).
For asymmetric Keynesian utilities, given , the proxy for risk, and , the proxy
for ambiguity, we show there exists a state-contingent claim ̂, “the reference point”
where  ◦ () is concave or pessimistic on
[̂+∞] ≡ { ∈ + :  ≥ ̂}
and  ◦ () is convex or optimistic on
(0 ̂] ≡ { ∈ + :  ≤ ̂}
Here is an example of a 2× 2 contingency table for an investor endowed with asym-
metric Keynesian utilities. We divide + into the standard 4 quadrants with the
reference point, ̂, as the origin:
Table 2
Quadrant II Quadrant I
Quadrant III Quadrant IV
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Define (0 ̂] ≡ quadrant III and [̂+∞] ≡ quadrant I. The cells of Table 2 is a
partition of the domain of  ◦(): In Table 3, losses relative to the reference point
̂ i.e., the state-contingent claims south-west of ̂are evaluated with a convex utility
function and gains relative relative to the reference point ̂, i.e., the state-contingent
claims north-east of ̂, are evaluated with a concave utility function.
Table 3
∇2 ◦ () is indefinite on Quadrant II  ◦ () is concave on Quadrant I
 ◦ () is convex on Quadrant III ∇2 ◦ () is indefinite on Quadrant IV
That is, the investor is a bull for “losses,” quadrant III, but a bear for “gains,”
quadrant I. In prospect theory, preferences for risk have a similar “shape,” see figure
10 in Kahneman (2011). Despite this apparent similarity, prospect theory, inspired
in part by the Allais paradox, is a critique and elaboration of expected utility theory
and Keynesian utility theory, inspired in part by the Ellsberg paradox, is a critique
and elaboration of subjective expected utility theory. In Keynesian utility theory
preferences for risk, as well as preferences for ambiguity, are the same for losses and
gains, and in prospect theory the investor is risk-averse for gains, but risk-seeking for
losses..
In the next section,we briefly review the theory of optimism-bias as proposed by
Bracha and Brown. In sections 3 and 4, we propose parametric and semiparametric
specifications of preferences for risk, preferences for ambiguity and their composition,
preferences for optimism. In the final section of the paper, we derive the Keynesian
Afriat inequalities for rationalizing the asset demands of investors with Keynesian
utilities.
Finally, a few words about the notions of risk, uncertainty, ambiguity and op-
timism, as they are used in this paper. Risk means we know the probabilities of
tomorrow’s state of the world. For Keynes (1937) uncertainty means we do not know
the probabilities, in fact the notion of probability of states of the world tomorrow
may be meaningless. Ellsberg (1961) introduced the notion of ambiguity as the al-
ternative notion to risk, where we are ignorant of the probability of states of the
world tomorrow. For Ellsberg there are two kinds of uncertainty: risk and ambiguity.
These are the conventions we follow. Optimism (pessimism) refers to the investor’s
subjective beliefs today regarding the relative likelihood of large versus small payoffs
of a state-contingent claim tomorrow.
2 Preferences for Ambiguity
The Bracha and Brown model of preferences for ambiguity has its origins in the
following quote of Keynes (1937): “By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not
mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable.
The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect
of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly
uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I
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am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or
the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence
of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the social system in
1970 About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable
probability whatever. We simply do not know.”1
By preferences for ambiguity we mean the variational preferences introduced by
MMR, and the  preferences introduced by Bracha and Brown. There is a third
class of preferences for ambiguity: ambiguity-neutral or subjective expected utility
functions, originally proposed by Savage (1954), as the foundation of Bayesian statis-
tics. As remarked by Aumann (1987) “His (Savage’s) postulate 4 (roughly speaking,
that the probability of an event is independent of the prize offered contingent on that
event) can only be understood in terms of a probability concept that has an existence
of its own in the decision maker’s mind, quite apart from preferences on acts. He
(Savage) wrote that ‘... the ... view sponsored here does not leave room for optimism
or pessimism... to play any role in the person’s judgement’ (1954, p. 68).” This is not
the view in the Keynesian aphorism: “The market price will be fixed at the point at
which the sales of the bears and the purchases of the bulls are balanced,” where as we
previously noted: bulls are optimistic investors and bears are pessimistic investors.
We are persuaded by Ellsberg’s (1961) critique of Savage’s theory of subjective
beliefs, where postulate 4 is refuted in Ellsberg’s thought experiments with two urns
containing black and white balls, that subjective expected utility is not a behavioral
theory of investment in financial markets, where investors may be either bulls or
bears. In Ellsberg’s thought experiments, each urn contains 100 balls. The risky
urn is known to contain 50 black balls. The distribution of black and white balls in
the other urn is unknown, this is the ambiguous urn. There are two experiments.
In the first experiment the investor is asked to choose an urn , if a black ball is
drawn then the investor receives $10.00, otherwise $0.00. In the second experiment
the payoffs are reversed. That is, if a white ball is drawn from the selected urn
then the investor receives $10.00, otherwise $0.00. If the investor chooses the risky
urn in both experiments, then she is ambiguity-averse If she chooses the ambiguous
urn in both experiments, then she is ambiguity-seeking. The investor is ambiguity-
neutral iff she chooses different urns in each experiment. Ellsberg predicts that most
investors will be ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse. This is the so-called Ellsberg
paradox. These experiments have been performed many times in many classrooms,
and Ellsberg’s prediction has been confirmed. Here is Ellsberg’s explanation of the
Ellsberg paradox in his (1961) article: “...we would have to regard the subject’s
subjective probabilities as being dependent upon his payoffs, his evaluation of the
outcomes ... it is impossible to infer from the resulting behavior a set of probabilities
for events independent of his payoffs.” His assertion contradicts Savage’s postulate
4.
Bracha and Brown proposed formal definitions of optimism-bias and pessimism-
bias, where they implicitly identify ambiguity and optimism. These definitions derive
from the representations of ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-averse utility functions
1Uncertainty in this quote means ambiguity in Ellsberg.
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as the Legendre—Fenchel biconjugates of convex and concave functions, where ∗()
is the Legendre—Fenchel conjugate of (()) For optimistic utility functions, we





 · () + ∗()]





 · () + (())]
For pessimistic utility functions, we invoke the Legendre—Fenchel biconjugate- conju-





 · () + ∗()]





 · () + (())]
If  () is a vector-valued map from  into  then  is strictly, monotone increas-
ing if for all  and  ∈  :
[− ] · [ ()−  ()]  0
If  () is a vector-valued map from  into  then  is strictly, monotone de-
creasing if for all  and  ∈  :
[− ] · [ ()−  ()]  0
As Bracha and Brown observed () is strictly convex in  where  = () iff ∇()
is a strictly, monotone increasing map of See section 5.4.3 in Ortega and Rheinboldt
(1970) for proof. It follows from the envelope theorem,
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Xb · () + ∗(b)]
and it follows from the envelope theorem,
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the interior of the probability simplex. Hence ∇() and ∇() k∇()k1 define
the same subjective betting odds that a given payoff  will be realized. If (())
is ambiguity-seeking and ()and () differ in only state  of the world, where





and (())  (()) consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of ambiguity-seeking
behavior. Hence ambiguity-seeking investors are bulls. If (()) is ambiguity-
averse and ()and () differ in only state  of the world, where ()  (). The





and (())  (()) consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of ambiguity-averse
behavior. Hence ambiguity-averse investors are bears.
3 Separable Keynesian Utilities
We begin our analysis with a parametric example of Keynesian utilities. Consider
the following additively separable utility function on the space of state-contingent
claims:





 ≡ (1 2  ) () ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) and  ◦ () ≡ 
If
() ≡  then  ◦ () = [()]
If  6 2, then () is concave in  If  6 2, then  6 2 and  ◦ () is
concave in . If  > 2, then  ◦()is convex in (). Hence, the composite utility
function  ◦ () is optimistic i.e., convex in the utilities of the payoffs. Moreover,
 ◦ () is concave in . In this case,  ◦ () is concave in  and convex in ()
If  6 2, then () is concave in  If  > 2, then  > 2 and  ◦ ()
is convex in . If  > 2, then  ◦ () is convex in (). Hence, the composite
utility function  ◦ () is optimistic, i.e., convex in the utilities of the payoffs.
Moreover,  ◦() is convex in . In this case,  ◦() is convex in  and convex in
(). Hence the value of  determines if the investor is endowed with pessimistic
Keynesian utility functions or endowed with optimistic Keynesian utility functions.
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We now present a nonparametric example of Keynesian utilities, where we again
consider additive utility functions of the form




where  : + → + and  : + → +.















where  = ();  = (1 2  ) and  = (1 2   )To check if  ◦ () is
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 0 for 1 ≤  ≤ 
Hence the Hessian matrix
2 ◦ ()


























the Arrow—Pratt local measure of absolute risk-seeking for (), where  = (),
we derive a sufficient condition for the Hessian of the additively separable  ◦ ()















































is sufficient for additively separable  ◦ () to be concave at . Constant relative










is the coefficient of absolute risk- aversion. If () is a  concave utility function
and () is a  convex utility function, then a sufficient condition for additively

























4 Amenable Keynesian Utilities
In this section, we propose semiparametric specifications of preferences for risk and
preferences for ambiguity, defined in part by scalar proxies for risk and ambiguity:
 and . Piecewise linear-quadratic functions and (fully) amenable functions were
introduced by Rockafellar (1988). A function  :  → ̄ is called piecewise linear-
quadratic if dom  can be represented as the union of finitely many polyhedral sets,
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where relative to each set () is of the form 1
2
+  · + , where  ∈   ∈ 
and  ∈ × is a symmetric matrix. A special case is where dom  consists of
a single set. A function  :  → ̄ is (fully) amenable if  =  ◦  , where  is
a 2 mapping and  is a piecewise linear-quadratic function.2 Concave quadratic
utility functions were introduced by Shannon and Zame (2002) in their analysis of
indeterminacy in infinite dimension general equilibrium models. () is a concave
quadratic function if for all  and :
()  () +∇() · ( − )− 1
2
 k − k2 ,where   0
We begin with necessary and sufficient conditions to rationalize the demands for
assets of investors endowed with amenable Keynesian utilities, where  ◦() is the
composition of a smooth, concave quadratic map ()where () is a diagonal 
matrix for each  ∈ ++ and a smooth, convex quadratic function (). That is,
we derive the quadratic Afriat inequalities for () and (). If () is a smooth,
concave quadratic utility function, then the quadratic Afriat inequalities for () are:
   +∇ · ( − )−  12 k − k2 for 1 ≤   ≤  , where   0
If we define the linear concave quadratic functions
() ≡  +∇ · (− )−  12 k− k2 for 1 ≤  ≤ 
then () = ∧=1() is a strictly concave function, where for all ∇2() = −.
If () is a smooth, convex quadratic utility function, then the quadratic Afriat
inequalities for () are:
   +∇ · ( − ) + 12 k − k2 for 1 ≤   ≤  where   0
If we define convex quadratic functions
() ≡  +∇ · (− ) + 12 k− k2 for 1 ≤  ≤ 
then () = ∨=1() is a strictly convex function, where for all , ∇2() = . If
 : + → +, then
() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( ))
is the state-utility vector for the state-contingent claim
 = (1 2   )
If  = [1 2   ] and  = [1 2   ], then
 ·  ≡ [11 22   ]
2There is a constraint qualification that is trivially satisfied in our case, where  is a diffeomor-
phism from ++ onto 





is the Hadamard or pointwise product of  and . If we define the gradient of
state-utility vector () as the vector
∇() ≡ [(1) (2)  ( )]
then by the chain rule
∇ ◦ () = [∇()] · [∇()(())]
If
() = () · ()
where () and () ∈ ++, then Bentler and Lee (1978) state and Magnus and
Neudecker (1985) prove that
∇() = ∇()diag(()) +∇()diag(())
All of analysis in this section derives from the following representation of ∇2 ◦():
∇2 ◦ () = ∇([∇()] · [∇()(())])
= [∇2()(())](diag[∇()])2 + [∇2()]diag[∇()(())]
If () is a concave quadratic map and () is a convex quadratic function, then
∇2() = −diag()  0
and
∇2() = diag()  0
If  and  are  × symmetric matrices then  -  iff  −  is negative semi-
definite, denoted: [−] . 0, where
∇2 ◦ () . 0 iff diag()diag[∇()]2 − diag()diag[∇()(())] . 0
See matrix inequalities in section A.5.2 in Boyd and Vandenberghe for a discussion
of the partial ordering . on the linear vector space of  ×  symmetric matrices.
For diagonal  × matrices  and  :
 .  ⇔  ≤ 
In the literature on expected utility theory, a Bernoulli utility function of wealth,
(), is said to be prudent if the marginal utility, , is a convex function of
wealth, i.e., the third derivative of () is positive. Prudence is often associated with
a precautionary motive for saving in the standard two period investment model. See
Leland (1968), who showed that the precautionary motive for saving is equivalent
to prudence. Also see Keynes (1930) on why investors hold money. There is a
second equivalent interpretation of prudence as observed by Tarazona-Gomez: “If we
consider the expected-utility framework, a prudent agent can be thought either as one
who increases his savings when uncertainty affects his future income, or even simpler,
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as someone who prefers to face a risk attached to a good state (the best outcome of
a lottery), rather than to a bad one (to the worst outcome). If symmetric Keynesian
utilities are the composition of quadratic utilities for risk and quadratic utilities for
ambiguity, then the third derivative of Keynesian utilities is positive. We define this
family of Keynesian utilities as prudent Keynesian utilities. We define asymmetric
Keynesian utilities,where the preferences for risk and preferences for ambiguity are
quadratic utilities, hence the third derivative is negative, as imprudent Keynesian
utilities. In both cases, all higher order derivatives, i.e., greater than four, are zero.
Hence prudent and imprudent Keynesian utilities have representations as fourth order
multivariate Taylor polynomials. These results follow from repeated application of
the chain rule to the derivatives of the Keynesian utilities. As in the literature on
expected utility theory – see Tarazona-Gomez (2004) and Roitman (2011) – risk
and prudence are uncorrelated in prudent Keynesian utilities. That is, the Keynesian
utilities for bulls are risk-seeking and the Keynesian utilities for bears are risk-averse,
but both bulls and bears are prudent, although we suspect that the bulls are less
prudent, since they expect high future incomes and the bears expect low future
incomes.
Theorem 1 If ◦() is the composition of quadratic utilities for risk and quadratic
utilities for ambiguity,where
diag() = diag[∇2()] and diag() = diag[∇2()(()]
then symmetric Keynesian utilities are prudent and asymmetric Keynesian utilities
are imprudent. That is, if  ◦() is symmetric then ∇3 ◦()  0 and if  ◦()
is asymmetric ∇3 ◦ ()  0. Moreover, ∇ ◦ () = 0 for  ≥ 5
Proof. If
∇ ◦ () = [∇()] · [∇()(())]
then
∇2 ◦ () = diag()(diag[∇()])2 + diag()diag[∇()(())]
∇3 ◦ () = 3diag()diag()diag[∇()]
∇4 ◦ () = 3diag()[diag()]2
∇ ◦ () = 0 for  ≥ 5
∇3 ◦ ()  0 iff  and  have different signs. That is, iff  ◦ () is asymmetric.
∇3 ◦()  0 iff  and  have the same sign. That is, iff  ◦() is symmetric.
5 Keynesian Afriat Inequalities
In our model, financial assets are limited liability, state-contingent claims on a finite
state-space. Investors are price-taking, utility maximizers subject to a budget con-
straint defined by the investor’s income and the market prices of assets. We begin
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by recalling, Afriat’s (1967) celebrated revealed preferences theorem on rationalizing
a finite number of a consumer’s utility maximizing demands, subject to a budget
constraint. The theorem states that these demands are rationalized by a concave
non-satiated utility function iff the Afriat inequalities, a finite family of multivariate
polynomial (linear) inequalities, where the unknowns are utility levels and marginal
utilities of income and the parameters are the market data, are feasible. The concave
non-satiated rationalizing utility function constructed by Afriat is a polyhedral func-
tion. That is, the minimum of a finite number of affine functions on  , derived from
solutions to the Afriat inequalities. If we restrict attention to systems of strict Afriat
inequalities, then this polyhedral function is differentiable at each of the consumer’s
utility maximizing demands. We extend Afriat’s theorem to the utility maximizing
demands for assets of investors endowed with uncertainty-aversion. The market data
is denoted
 ≡ { }==1 
 and  are in 

++. The utility function  : 

+ →  rationalizes  if
() = max
·6·
() for 1 6  6 
The strict Afriat inequalities:
()  () +  · ( − ) for 1 6   6 
Afriat’s polyhedral function:
b() ≡ ∧==1 [() +  · ( − )]
It follows from Danksin’s Theorem on directional derivatives of polyhedral functions
– see Proposition 451 in Bertsekas et al. (2003) that
∇b() =  for 1 6  6 
The logic of our proofs is based on the chain rule for the composition of a smooth,
convex quadratic function ()from ++ into + with a smooth, concave quadratic
map () from ++ onto 

++ and the Kuhn—Tucker Theorem (KTT). In particular,
we assume that  is differentiable at the data points  and () is differentiable
at  ≡ (), for 1 6  6  .
In Theorems 2 and 3, we derive the quadratic Afriat inequalities for asymmetric
Keynesian utilities, where we prove the existence of a reference point ̂ that partitions
+ into the standard four quadrants, with the reference point ̂ as the origin. ◦()
is concave in quadrant , where quadrant  ≡ { ∈ + :  ≥ ̂} and convex in
quadrant , where quadrant  ≡ { ∈ + :  ≤ ̂} The Hessian of  ◦ () is
indefinite in quadrants II and IV. That is, ∇2 ◦() is indefinite on +{(̂+∞]∪
(0 ̂]}.  ◦() is optimistic for “losses,” i.e.,  ≤ ̂ and pessimistic for “gains,” i.e.,
 ≥ ̂, analogous with the shape of the utility of risk in prospect theory – see figure
10 in Kahneman (2011).
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Theorem 2 If ◦(), is the composition of () and (),where (a) (1 2  ) ≡
 = () ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) is a monotone, smooth, concave quadratic map
from ++ onto 

++ ,with the proxy for risk, −  0 (b) () is a monotone, smooth,
convex quadratic function from + into with the proxy for ambiguity,   0, (c)
∇2 ◦ ̂() = diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 − diag()diag[∇()(̂())]: Chain Rule
then there exists a reference point ̂ such that the financial market data  is ratio-
nalized by the composite function (()) with two domains of convexity: (̂+∞]
and (0 ̂]where  ◦ () is concave on (̂+∞] and  ◦ () is convex on (0 ̂] iff
the quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for risk-averse  : ++ → ++ and the
quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for ambiguity-seeking  : + → .
Proof. Necessity is obvious. For sufficiency, we consider the following family of
quadratic Afriat inequalities:
 = (1 2  ) ∈ interior (̂+∞] or ∈ interior (0,̂]
()− ()  ()( − )− [ − ][ − ]
for 1 6   6 ; 1 6  6 
() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) for 1 6  6 
∇() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) for 1 6  6 
()− ()  [∇()] · [ − ]− 2 [ − ] ◦ [ − ] for 1 6   6 
(())− (())  [∇()(())] · [()− ()] + 2 k[())− (()]k2
for 1 6   6 
If
b() ≡ ∧==1 [()+()(−)− 2 (−)2 for 1 6  6  and   0
̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b( )) for 1 6  6 
∇̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b( )) for 1 6  6 
̂() ≡ ∧==1 [̂() +∇̂() ◦ (− )− diag()2 (− ) ◦ (− )]
∇2̂() = −diag() where   0: Risk-Averse




(̂()) = diag() where   0: Ambiguity-Seeking
















Theorem 3 If ◦(), is the composition of () and (),where (a) (1 2  ) ≡
 = () ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) is a monotone, smooth, convex quadratic map
from ++ onto 

++ with the proxy for risk,   0, (b) () is a monotone, smooth,
concave quadratic function from + into  with the proxy for risk,−  0, (c)
∇2 ◦ ̂() = −diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 + diag()diag[∇()(̂())]: Chain Rule
then there exists a reference point ̂ such that the financial market data  is ratio-
nalized by the composite function (()) with two domains of convexity: (̂+∞]
and (0 ̂]where (()) is concave on (̂+∞] and (()) is convex on (0 ̂] iff
the quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for risk-seeking  : ++ → ++ and the
quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for ambiguity-averse  : + → .
Proof. Necessity is obvious. For sufficiency, we consider the following family of
quadratic Afriat inequalities:
 = (1 2   ) ∈ interior (̂+∞]  ∈ interior (0 ̂]
()− ()  ()( − )− [ − ][ − ]
for 1 6   6 ; 1 6  6 
() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) for 1 6  6 
∇() ≡ ((1) (2)  ()) for 1 6  6 
()− ()  [∇()] ◦ [ − ] + 2 [ − ] ◦ [ − ] for 1 6   6 
(())− (())  [∇()(())] · [()− ()]− 2 k[())− (()]k2
f or 1 6   6 
If
b() ≡ ∧==1 [() + () · ( − )− 2 ( − )2 for 1 6  6 
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̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b( )) for 1 6  6 
∇̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b()) for 1 6  6 
̂() ≡ ∧==1 [̂() +∇̂() ◦ (− ) + diag()2 (− ) ◦ (− )]
∇2̂() = diag() where   0: Risk-Seeking




(̂()) = −diag() where   0: Ambiguity-Averse















The symmetric Keynesian utilities are the bulls and the bears, where for all  ∈
++
Bulls: ∇2 ◦ ̂() = diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 + diag()diag[∇()(̂())]  0
Bears: ∇2 ◦ ̂() = −diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 − diag()diag[∇()(̂())]  0
The quadratic Afriat inequalities for symmetric Keynesian utilities follow easily from
the arguments in Theorems 2 and 3.
Theorem 4 If ◦(), is the composition of () and (),where (a) (1 2  ) ≡
 = () ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) is a monotone, smooth, concave quadratic map
from ++ onto 

++, with the proxy for risk, −  0 (b) () is a monotone,
smooth,concave quadratic function from ++ into , with the proxy for ambiguity,
−  0 (c)
∇2 ◦ ̂() = −diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 − diag()diag[∇()(̂())]: Chain Rule
then  ◦ () is concave on ++ iff the quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for
risk-averse  : ++ → ++ and the quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for
ambiguity-averse  : + → .
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Proof. Necessity is obvious. For sufficiency, we consider the following family of
Afriat quadratic inequalities:
 = (1 2    ) ∈ interior (̂+∞] or ∈ interior (0,̂]
()− ()  () · ( − )− [ − ][ − ]
for 1 6   6 ; 1 6  6 
() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) for 1 6  6 
∇() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) for 1 6  6 
()− ()  [∇()] ◦ [ − ]− 2 [ − ] ◦ [ − ] for 1 6   6 
(())− (())  [∇()(())] · [()− ()]− 2 k[())− (()]k2
for 1 6   6 
If
b() ≡ ∧==1 [() + ()( − )− 2 ( − )2 for 1 6  6 
̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b( )) for 1 6  6 
∇̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b( )) for 1 6  6 
̂() ≡ ∧==1 [̂() +∇̂() ◦ (− )− diag()2 (− ) ◦ (− )]
∇2̂() = diag() where −   0: Risk-Averse




(̂()) = −diag() where −   0: Ambiguity-Averse
Bears: ∇2 ◦ ̂() = −diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 − diag()diag[∇()(̂())]  0
Theorem 5 If ◦(), is the composition of () and (),where (a) (1 2  ) ≡
 = () ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) is a monotone, smooth, convex quadratic map
from ++ onto 

++,with the proxy for risk,   0 (b) () is a monotone, smooth,
convex quadratic function from ++ into , with the proxy for ambiguity,   0, (c)
∇2 ◦ ̂() = diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 + diag()diag[∇()(̂())]: Chain Rule
then  ◦ () is convex on ++ iff the quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for
risk-seeking  : ++ → ++ and the quadratic Afriat inequalities are feasible for
ambiguity-seeking  : + → .
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Proof. Necessity is obvious. For sufficiency, we consider the following family of
Afriat quadratic inequalities:
 = (1 2  ) ∈ interior (̂+∞] or ∈ interior (0,̂]
()− ()  ()( − ) + [ − ][ − ]
for 1 6   6 ; 1 6  6 
() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) for 1 6  6 
∇() ≡ ((1) (2)  ( )) for 1 6  6 
()− ()  [∇()] ◦ [ − ] + 2 [ − ] ◦ [ − ] for 1 6   6 
(())− (())  [∇()(())] · [()− ()] + 2 k[())− (()]k2
for 1 6   6 
If
b() ≡==1 ∨[() + ()( − ) + 2 ( − )2 for 1 6  6 
̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b( )) for 1 6  6 
∇̂() ≡ (b(1) b(2)  b( )) for 1 6  6 
̂() ≡ ∨==1 [̂() +∇̂() ◦ (− ) + diag()2 (− ) ◦ (− )]
∇2̂() = diag() where   0: Risk-Seeking




(̂()) = −diag() where   0: Ambiguity-Seeking
Bulls: ∇2 ◦ ̂() = diag()(diag[∇̂()])2 + diag()diag[∇()(̂())]  0
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